4 on this connection in the last years. 7 What has been traditionally played down, however, and only recently attracted the attention of Cusa scholars, is the fact that Cusa did not at all agree with the theories of his Stammtisch-friends -this despite the notorious 'modern' features of his philosophy. and art such as Paul Cézanne, Alfred Hitchcock, and Jacques Lacan, as we will see below; Cusa's deconstruction of Alberti in fact takes a significant step beyond the postmodern, critical stocktaking of the modern age. 10 The following essay provides a short introduction to the key problems of this text in the light of these late-modern developments, focusing particularly on the issues of visibility and invisibility, which at their heart are questions that arose in relation to Pseudo-Dionysius' Mystical Theology.
Cusa's Experimental Staging of the Modern Perspective
In 1452 the Monks of Tegernsee put to Cusa the question of how the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite might be conceived. Cusa's De visione Dei was his response, which took the form of an experimental introduction to the mystical theology of his philosophical paragon. For together with his book, he sent to his friends an icon 7 something more exceptional still: namely that the gaze follows the movements of all viewers simultaneously, even when they are moving in opposite directions.
The Coincidence of Vision and Audition
This leads us to Cusa's well-known concept of the 'coincidence of opposites'
(coincidentia oppositorum). That the gaze of the all-seeing figure follows individual movements might appear 'impossible'; but this appearance is itself still consistent with the law of contradiction. By contrast, the fact that the gaze moves simultaneously in opposite directions offends the law of contradiction. Hence it touches on a more rigorous 'impossibility'.
This last point is cardinal for Cusa's concept of God. The principles of human reason require us to distinguish between opposite determinations: if something is moving to the right it cannot simultaneously move to the left; a straight line cannot simultaneously be a curved line, etc. The principles of rationality require us to demarcate using opposing determinations. But to distinguish or to de-fine something is tantamount to conceiving something as limited or finite; and this precisely explains why human reason is pushed to its limits whenever it tries to conceive the in-finity of God. 
Alberti's Account of the Modern Perspective
Perspectivity, Individuality, Plurality: in appreciating these phenomena as matters of ultimate concern, we have already exceeded the threshold of modernity. 13 However, as the art historian Hans Belting has pointed out, the all-seeing gaze of Cusa's icon is incompatible with the strategy of early modern portrait art which seeks to tie the gaze of a portrait to a fixed angle of vision from which it can be appropriated and annexed. This compositional strategy was consistent with Alberti's theoretical innovations, which introduced the two key concepts of modern science and culture: 15 the vanishing lines reflect the invisible eye point of the viewer before the painting; and this puts the latter in the position of an autonomous observer, who can control the space of his perception as if it were nothing but a mirror image of his subjective position.
Our gaze is no longer exterior to these paintings, as the eye point in the above illustration demonstrates. On the one hand, the eye point (Z) functions as a variable that can be occupied by every single viewer, starting with the painter; on the other hand this point becomes visible in the virtual space of the image, since it is reflected by the vanishing point (V) at the horizon. According to the mythological tradition, Narcissus fell in love with his mirror image, and became engulfed by its elusiveness. As Karsten Harris has argued, this counterintuitive concept of artistic realism came about for pragmatic reasons. The sacrifice of our everyday realism was the price to be paid for a simulacrum that permitted representational security. 21 Similar to Ulysses, who let himself be tied to the mast of his ship so that he could listen to the deceptive sounds of the Sirens without getting lured by their mortal attraction, the viewer is required to suppress his natural inclination to act if he wants to enjoy the narcissistic achievements of the time to come -though it arguably took more than three further centuries of habituation with the ties of perspective art before we became able to enjoy virtualized violence without giving way to our responsive inclination to act. painter depicted, for example, the golden belt of Dido he had to make it look as if it were golden without using a colour that exposed the painting to the lighting conditions of its real time environment. Shimmering effects were desirable in an ontological realist tradition that appreciated the tactile presence of paintings in the real space we inhabit.
They enabled the viewer to immerse him or herself into the depicted drama without getting out of touch with her earthly world that recalled her distance to the invisible plenitude of God. Lacan's speculative theory aimed to explain how we retroactively imagine the emergence of subjective autonomy and intersubjectivity as 'revealed' in the therapeufartic experience of psychoanalysis. This is consistent with the Kantian assumption that subjectivity is not an empirical fact but a condition of the possibility of empirical experiences. For this reason, it would be pointless to "disprove" Lacan's theory, for example based on empirical observations about joint attention in childparent dyads.
'boy' (puer), that is able to talk with and listen to others is provoked by the desire of its heart. As Augustine puts it in his Confessions, the infans does not learn to talk by imitating its parents; it is drawn into conversation by its heart 'with gruntings, varieties of voices, and various motions.' 37 It is the nexus amoris, the 'bond of love' that makes the infant fall in love with its 'narcissistic' mirror image; and it is the same bond that provokes the metamorphosis into a 'boy' as soon as the infant falls in love with a reality that transcends the virtual space of mirroring effects (in the above key passage Augustine does not differentiate between boys and girls).
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In De visione dei this nexus is associated with the irresistible erotic attraction of the iconic gaze that arouses our desire for the vision of God. The desire of our heart makes us aware that we are surrounded by signposts that point beyond themselves. The visible world is literally saturated with traces of an invisible reality that attracts our attention. 
37

Non enim eram infans, qui non farer, sed iam puer loquens eram. Et memini hoc, et unde loqui didiceram, post adverti. Non enim docebant me maiores homines praebens mihi verba (…) sed ego ipse mente, quam dedisti mihi, deus meus, cum gemitibus et vocibus variis et variis membrorum motibus
The Unmasking of Alberti's "Narcissus" in Post-modernity
Lacan argues that as soon as the infant learns to talk with and listen to others, it becomes trapped in the insatiable dynamics of human desire. Where he differs from Cusa is that the dynamics of this desire is, according to Lacan's reflexive approach, not Sigmund Freud, the destructive sides of our narcissistic self-regard. 42 Consequently Lacan treats our poetic ability to link and combine information across sensory modalities as part of an elaborate, albeit creative, strategy of self-deception that is derived from more elementary dynamics of mimetic rivalry. Given this alternative, our answer to the question of whether Augustine's loving desire is only an epiphenomenon
arguably depends on what we consider to be more elementary: the ambiguity of an undetermined scenario of drives that can only be determined via a socially mediated processes of mirroring in which good and evil tend to neutralize each other; or the poetic guidance of narratives and liturgical practices that enable us to disentangle the dynamic of our desires without getting disorientated in the ambiguity of an ultimately pointless zero-sum game. Our ability to appreciate this phenomenon is mediated by Jesus Christ, Cusa maintains, and by the theological promise that his remaining presence will enable every believer to perceive the invisible Son of God in the visible face of his neighbour. However, Cusa's solution to this problem provokes the modern suspicion that he takes this step too quickly. To be sure, every Christian since Saint Paul knows that the decision to believe is madness, and the above quotation demonstrates that Cusa was familiar with this tradition. But the fine line that separates the madness of faith from its destination has grown into a nihilistic abyss in the five centuries that followed Cusa's late medieval experiment.
The Return of the Invisible in Late Modernity
This abyss becomes most evident if we compare Cusa's account of the invisible with the modern re-emergence of the invisible in the wake of Paul Cezanne's deconstruction of the linear perspective. Certeau refers to Lacan's contributions to the related phenomenological debates, which build in turn on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's groundbreaking publications about Cézanne, as well as his Phenomenology of Perception. 46 Merleau-Ponty had demonstrated that Alberti's linear perspective is not as realistic as it purports to be; and that, in fact, Cézanne's paintings actually do more justice to our perception, though they appear at first glance to be distorted: 'when our eye runs over a large surface, the images it successively receives are taken from different points of view, and the whole surface is warped'. 47 Similar to Picasso's cubistic paintings, the paintings of Cézanne and his successors appear 'warped' because they do justice to the temporal dynamics of human perception. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:
Perspectival distortions are no longer visible in their own right but rather contribute, as they do in natural vision, to the impression of an emerging order, of an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes. narcissistic obsession with mirror images. The face is a mere camouflage; the truth behind it is, as Lacan puts it in his Séminaire XI, nothing but 'faeces' -a heap of shit.
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Lacan's deconstruction of the Cartesian concept of subjectivity confronted his disciples with an abyss of desire that recalled the nightmares of his 'paranoiac critical' 55 surrealist contemporaries. In the quotation, prefixed to his essay on Cusa, Certeau quotes a sentence of Octavio Paz' Pasado en claro that goes to the heart of these nightmares:
I am inside the eye: the well where from the beginning a child is falling, the well where I count the time I took to fall from the beginning.
Lacan's contemporary Alfred Hitchcock provided the cinematographic counterpart to this poetic nightmare when he staged one of the best-known scenes of Western film history, the iconic, in terms of our late-modern imagination, 'Shower Scene' of his shot, the curtain is suddenly ripped aside, though it is still not possible to identify the face of the perpetrator. This is followed by a sequence of cubistic point-of-view shots that demonstrates to us that we have lost control of our visual faculties. After the enigmatic killer has left the room, the shower scene ends by revealing the truth about the victim -announced by her tearing down the curtain -as we see the blood of Marion sucked into the whirlpool of the drainage pipe, which becomes eventually superimposed by a single eye spinning round in the opposite direction. Lacan used to recall that, according to Freud, dream images of a drainage pipes are nothing but a symbol for the shit that hides behind the screen of our narcissistic illusions. The downside of Marion's face is exactly that, faeces.
Cusa's Alternative Account of the Invisible
This disturbing revelation leads us back to our starting point: in Lacan and Hitchcock the 'bond of love', that makes human faces appear as attractive, is nothing but an epiphenomenon of mirror effects that hide the drain beneath the surface. However, if a concept of rationality, that is supposed to be realistic, leads to the conclusion that what we consider reality to be is nothing but an illusion, would it then not be more reasonable to question the non-realist prejudices that make this appear conclusive? Cusa took this step at the very moment when the narcissistic age of modern science and culture was about to emerge, and this is why the late Certeau started to reconstruct Cusa's liturgical concept of space when he tried to deconstruct the philosophical nightmares of his psychoanalytic teacher. In contrast to Alberti, the invisible becomes again visible in late-modernity; but now the lack of a social space undermines the attitude of trust that characterized the liturgical space of pre-modern thinkers like Cusa and Van Eyck. The invisible appears, but now only as virtuality, viz. as a paranoid construct that at the same time negates and obscures its roots in the actuality of real time encounters. In contrast to this representationalist focus on 'virtual realities', Cusa's vera icona is more comparable with a readymade in the style of Marcel Duchamp's landmark urinal "Fountain" of 1917 that evoked tactile and olfactory associations. As George Didi-Huberman has demonstrated, starting from this prototypical example, artistic objects like these have more in common with medieval contact relics than with an image in which we can immerse ourselves. 57 They recover the situated, real time aspects of our perception.
Cusa does something similar when he focuses on an image relic that can be touched and kissed: the gaze of his vera icona is not associated with a virtual space but with an actual physical object, while its unfathomable attraction is due to the multiplication of perspectives in the social space of the monks, and not to the representative multiplication of perspectives within the virtual space of an image. Unlike Picasso, Hitchcock and Lacan, the visibility of the invisible is in Cusa associated with visible bodies, and our poetic ability to 'see' what we can hear, smell and touch. I can perceive the invisible in other faces due to a poetic sensitivity that is rooted in an attitude of trust.
And it is would be inappropriate if we tried to demonstrate that this is possible based on phenomenological analyses of phenomena of 'givenness', as the post-Cartesian tradition of modern philosophy might mislead us to do. It suffices to deconstruct the counterintuitive, representationalist presuppositions of philosophical or 'scientific' theories that undermine our ability to trust in the primordial realism of our everyday perception -"unless he believed, he would not understand", says Nicholas of Cusa (n. 3,22f.; Hp n. 4). In the 15 th century Alberti distanced himself from Cennino Cennini when he insisted that the invisible is not the business of painters; five hundred years later the invisible attracted the attention of painters and artists more than ever before. But the late modern revival of the invisible was still focused on Alberti's representationalist imaginary space, and this prevented it from regaining its social and liturgical significance. It is precisely this, however, which Cusa's experimental introduction to Pseudo-Dionysius'
Mystical Theology offers us -a realist awareness of the social and liturgical dynamic that underpins the invisible in a medieval context and which thus presents a challenge to the basic assumptions of our post-Cartesian way of thinking.
